Afghanistan-Pakistan border clash: Reasons, perspective and future directions

Recent border conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan have once again increased tensions along the Durand Line. This line is a long and porous border where militancy, cross-border infiltration, and differing political priorities continue to undermine efforts at lasting peace.

A view of Istanbul, where diplomatic talks have taken place to resolve the border conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Photo/CCTV

Reasons for clash

The first reason for the recent clashes is cross-border militancy. Militants from Afghan territory have repeatedly attempted to infiltrate Pakistan through areas such as North Waziristan and Kurram, carrying out attacks against Pakistani security forces and civilians. Pakistan views these incidents as a direct threat to its sovereignty and a continuation of violence that started since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021.

The second reason is the governance gap within Afghanistan. Pakistan believes that Afghanistan lacks both the will and capacity to control militant groups operating on its soil, particularly the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Pakistan argues that these groups operate training camps, recruitment centers, and command networks inside Afghanistan, launching coordinated attacks against Pakistan’s border regions. This perception has led Pakistan to conclude that the Afghan Taliban are either unwilling or unable to dismantle these sanctuaries, further eroding trust between the two countries.

The third reason is disagreement over border management. Pakistan views the fencing of the Durand Line and stricter border regulation as essential measures to prevent terrorism, smuggling, and illegal crossings. It considers fencing a necessary step to bring stability to a historically unregulated border. However, Afghan border forces and local Pashtun communities strongly oppose these measures, arguing that fencing divides families, disrupts trade, and undermines centuries-old tribal and cultural linkages across the border. This difference in approach has fueled frequent skirmishes and hardened positions on both sides.

The fourth reason is deep-seated mutual mistrust and conflicting narratives. Afghan Taliban provide shelter to the TTP and fail to fulfill commitments under agreements such as the Doha Accord, which obligate Afghanistan not to allow its territory to be used for terrorism against neighbouring states. Despite repeated Pakistani appeals, the TTP continues to operate from Afghan soil, conducting attacks across the border. The Taliban government, however, denies these facts. It claims that it neither supports nor controls the group. This denial, in Pakistan’s view, is a major source of frustration and a reflection of Afghanistan’s unwillingness to address security concerns seriously.

Perspective analysis

From Pakistan’s perspective, these reasons combine to form a clear security grievance. Pakistan sees its border-management process, including fencing, surveillance, and limited air operations, as a defensive necessity rather than aggression. Pakistan maintains that it is legally and morally justified in defending its sovereignty when attacks originate from Afghan territory. This perception of self-defense is reflected in Pakistan’s military operations, which include limited cross-border strikes targeting TTP hideouts in provinces like Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktika, and Khost. Pakistan argues that these operations are aimed solely at neutralizing terrorist networks, not at escalating hostilities with Afghanistan. However, these strikes have triggered border clashes and diplomatic protests. At the same time, Pakistan is under domestic pressure: it cannot afford a prolonged front of instability along its north-western border, especially given its economic and security challenges.

Diplomatic engagement has taken place through the Doha and Istanbul talks, which brought delegations from both sides together under mediation by Qatar and Turkey. These talks resulted in a temporary ceasefire and an agreement to pursue dialogue aimed at addressing the root causes of tension. However, the Istanbul round revealed deep differences. Pakistan criticized the Afghan delegation’s “illogical stance” and demanded verifiable mechanisms to ensure that militant infiltration stops. The Afghan side, asserting its sovereignty, denied harbouring militants and offered mediation with the TTP instead of direct action. Pakistan has rejected this approach calling it unacceptable. Pakistan's Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has even publicaly warned that failure to reach an agreement in Istanbul talks with Afghanistan could lead to “open war”.

In the near future, Pakistan and Afghanistan may extend the current ceasefire temporarily to prevent further escalation. However, Pakistan views ceasefires and short-term truces as insufficient if they are not followed by verifiable action against militant groups. Long-term stability, in Pakistan’s view, requires the Afghan Taliban to fulfill their obligations under international and bilateral accords, especially the commitment not to allow their territory to be used for terrorism.

Future directions

Looking ahead, Pakistan foresees a tense border environment unless Afghanistan takes concrete and verifiable action against anti-Pakistan militant groups. Pakistan’s military strategy is a shift from covert influence to direct coercion. The first action Pakistan will pursue is high-intensity military strikes and cross-border raids targeting TTP sanctuaries inside Afghanistan. These operations will aim to degrade militant infrastructure and demonstrate Pakistan’s resolve. While such measures carry the risk of escalation and international criticism, Pakistan considers them necessary to ensure deterrence and domestic credibility.

After Pakistan’s successful military response to India’s actions in May this year, marked by effective air and missile operations during the Pahalgam Conflict, Pakistan’s confidence in its defense capabilities is at a high point. The Pakistani military has shown strong ability to carry out accurate, well-coordinated strikes and maintain a high level of readiness, supported by solid intelligence and diplomatic cooperation. This preparedness and strength now shape Pakistan’s firm approach to security challenges along its border with Afghanistan.

The second action involves precision-based counterterrorism (CT) operations dependent on reliable intelligence and, ideally, cooperation from Afghanistan. Pakistan’s security agencies will continue to conduct targeted operations using drones and precision strikes. Yet, without Afghan coordination, such operations risk limited success and potential collateral damage.

The third action will be renewed diplomatic engagement with the United States. Pakistan could seek intelligence-sharing and CT assistance to strengthen leverage over the Taliban regime. While this could align with US concerns about extremist resurgence in Afghanistan, Pakistan would have to balance this cooperation carefully to avoid friction with China and other regional partners.

If Afghanistan demonstrates genuine commitment to dismantling militant networks, the two countries could gradually rebuild trust through cooperation on trade, border management, and CT. However, if Afghanistan continues to deny responsibility or fails to curb cross-border militancy, Pakistan is fully prepared to escalate operations to protect its sovereignty. Chances are grim that Afghanistan under the current Taliban regime will be able to control the TTP.

 

Dr. Gulshan Rafiq

About the writer: Dr. Gulshan Rafiq graduated from Fudan University, Shanghai. Currently she is serving as Assistant Professor of International Relations at Centre for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad.