After Modi: Political leadership and the future of Indian foreign policy

By the time of India’s next national election in 2029, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be 78 years old. At present, it is unclear whether he will run for another term. It is equally unclear who within his party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), might succeed him when he eventually retires. In the latter scenario, the BJP itself may be in a difficult electoral position without Modi’s personal charisma and mass following. This unclear line of succession in the BJP could lead to India’s current political opposition, led by the Indian National Congress party, winning the first election of the post-Modi era and consolidating power for itself and its allies with an eye on future electoral cycles.

Against this backdrop, this essay identifies two individuals from within Modi’s own party and from within the opposition as representing the next generation of India’s political leaders. They are Yogi Adityanath, who is a seasoned BJP leader and currently chief minister of Uttar Pradesh (India’s most populous state), and Rahul Gandhi, who is de facto leader of the Congress party and leader of the opposition in the lower house of parliament. Both Adityanath and Gandhi are in their early 50s, at least 20 years younger than Modi, and therefore positioned for long periods of rule, making them “next generation” in terms of age and political longevity as well. Both have already spent long periods in politics, though neither has held a position in the executive branch of government at the national level.

The focus on individuals is warranted because foreign policymaking in India is traditionally a centralized process in which the role of the prime minister is paramount. Policymaking has become even more centralized in the Modi era, which has been marked by personalistic and top-down leadership. At the same time, both leaders represent broader intellectual currents within their respective parties—Adityanath the assertive Hindu nationalists of the BJP and Gandhi the pre-Modi civic nationalists of Congress-led coalitions. They should thus be seen as representatives of potential future leadership rather than future leaders themselves.

Next-Generation Worldviews

Three factors broadly shape the foreign policy views of Adityanath and Gandhi. First, the overriding importance of economic development, political stability, and social advancement at the domestic level. The public statements of both leaders are focused mostly on domestic issues. However, their preferred pathways to a more prosperous and stable future for India are dramatically different. Adityanath takes a hard-edged Hindu nationalist view, seeing Indian Muslims and other religious minorities as internal adversaries. In this worldview, economic development and political stability can only come from a coercive state that disciplines minorities in the process of building a Hindu nation. By contrast, Gandhi views Modi’s BJP as a singular threat to Indian democracy and multiculturalism. Economic development and political stability for Gandhi are only possible in a system where a multitude of voices and priorities are fully represented. A future government under Adityanath could thus take a more uncompromising approach toward predominantly Islamic states and societies in India’s neighborhood (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and Maldives) and beyond. Modi’s successful diplomacy with Gulf states (especially the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar) could similarly be undone by a hard-line Hindu nationalist successor. By contrast, a future government under Gandhi would not face such compulsions or challenges.

Second, India’s national security in the face of regional rivals Pakistan and China looms large as another factor shaping the views of these two leaders. Both leaders have taken strong stances on national security issues, albeit with differing emphasis. Adityanath is singularly focused on Pakistan as an existential threat to India and has publicly stated that Pakistan is a “failed nation,” sponsors terrorism, and will someday either “merge into India or will cease to exist.” Gandhi, while maintaining a firm stance on Pakistan, appears to view China as the greater threat and has repeatedly accused the Modi government of failing in its foreign policy by permitting China and Pakistan to fuse into a common threat. Whereas earlier Indian policy planners worried about a two-front war, according to Gandhi, the India-Pakistan military crisis of May 2025 showed that the Chinese and Pakistani militaries and foreign policy establishments are integrated to the point of presenting a united front against India.

Third, both leaders are nationalists motivated by a sense of Indian exceptionalism, again with different understandings of India’s place in the world. Adityanath emphasizes India’s greatness as a Hindu civilization and often invokes ideas inspired by the notion of Akhand Bharat or “undivided India,” seeing South Asia as part of a greater Hindu civilizational sphere that will be eventually reintegrated. This worldview rejects non-Hindu Indian political and intellectual traditions as foreign. It calls on Hindus to “get rid of the mindset of slavery” and reject colonial ideas—not only from British rule but also from the Islamic rule of the prior Mughal Empire—that valorize the foreigner as superior. By contrast, Gandhi’s view of India’s greatness originates in its anti-colonial struggle and the world historical importance of figures such as Jawaharlal Nehru (his own great-grandfather) and Mahatma Gandhi (no relation). Nehru led the establishment of Indian democracy, which Rahul Gandhi views as a “global public good” and India’s “greatest strategic asset.” He thus views India as a global exemplar of nonviolence, openness, and pluralism, values that he alleges are being corrupted by Modi’s BJP. Yet Gandhi also acknowledges that these values are constrained by the realities of national security—for example, he has stated that India cannot have good relations with Pakistan so long as the latter promotes terrorism in India.

Based on the above analysis, one can characterize the worldview that Adityanath represents as hard-line Hindu nationalist and the worldview that Gandhi represents as civic nationalist. Both see India as exceptional, advocate firm responses to external adversaries, and prioritize socioeconomic development. However, they are fundamentally at odds in their views on what the ideal Indian polity is and how it should be achieved. While the implications of this difference are primarily internal to India, domestic politics affect foreign policy in systematic ways. Adityanath and Gandhi represent the most prominent worldviews in the next generation of political leaders grappling with domestic challenges and the uncertainties of the current international order.

Generational Perspectives on U.S.-China Competition

In the post–Cold War era, India has used U.S.-China competition to pursue its own great-power ambitions. Due to its long-standing rivalry with China, India has developed a robust strategic partnership with the United States that vitally includes defense collaboration and coproduction. At the same time, China remains India’s largest trade partner, supplying manufactured goods at prices that India’s large and mostly low-income consumer base can afford. The country’s traditional approach, therefore, has been to “leverage” both sides to benefit from each power’s desire to cultivate New Delhi’s support or at least avoid any adverse diplomatic entanglements with a nuclear-armed regional power.

Since the turn of the 21st century, India-U.S. relations have steadily improved on the back of trade in goods and services and growing people-to-people ties. Meanwhile, after a period of relative tranquility along their disputed Himalayan border, relations between India and China have turned antagonistic. Since the early 2010s, India has alleged multiple Chinese incursions into disputed territories, culminating in a military skirmish that caused fatalities on both sides in 2020. Both militaries remain present in the region while dialogue on disengagement slowly drudges along. Today, a rapprochement with Beijing is more important to New Delhi than before. The latter’s relations with Washington have turned sour over trade imbalances, the dramatic increase in India’s imports of Russian oil since the invasion of Ukraine, and New Delhi’s inability to manage political sensitivities with the Trump administration during military hostilities between India and Pakistan in May 2025.

The swings in India’s relations with the United States and China suggest that the country has traditionally tilted toward one power to manage or mitigate its problems with the other. From the late 1980s onward, India sought better relations with China partly as a potential hedge against U.S. unipolarity. In the mid-2000s, New Delhi began developing durable strategic ties with Washington in response to the latter’s diplomatic overtures. A decade later, deteriorating relations with Beijing over border incursions gave fresh impetus to India-U.S. ties. However, as mentioned above, recent troubles in U.S.-India relations have prompted New Delhi to begin repairing relations with Beijing. It is, of course, very likely that India-China relations will deteriorate again, especially given China’s long-standing material and diplomatic support for Pakistan. At that point, one might expect New Delhi to once again tilt toward Washington.

Next-Generation Approaches to U.S.-China Competition

The next generation of political leadership in India is unlikely to deviate significantly from the precedent established by past and current leaders. This continuity is due to the precedent dictated by India’s strategic circumstances of being a substantially weaker power—albeit one with nuclear weapons—than both the United States and China. India depends on both powers and must therefore navigate their competition in a way that preserves its autonomy while bolstering its security and economic power.

As leaders who are representative of the next generation, Yogi Adityanath and Rahul Gandhi are broadly in agreement on China. Both see China as a direct threat to India’s sovereignty and an indirect threat as an enabler of Pakistan. While neither has commented directly on China when his own party has been in power, when in opposition both have described China as encroaching on Indian territory, allying with Pakistan, and encircling India by developing ties with India’s smaller neighbors such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. A handful of other political leaders of their generation—such as Anurag Thakur of the BJP and Sachin Pilot of the Congress party—have taken similar positions. During the BJP’s rule since 2014, however, younger party leaders have mostly deferred to the government on this issue. Conversely, younger leaders of the Congress party have taken their cue from Gandhi and criticized the government for being weak on China.

Despite these similarities between Adityanath and Gandhi, there is a qualitative difference in their views of China, which in turn is related to their opposing worldviews and visions for the roles of the United States and China. Adityanath is a hard sovereigntist whose primary focus is on building an internally secure Hindu nation. According to this view, both China and the United States threaten India’s sovereignty to varying degrees. China may pose a direct and immediate threat, but India cannot afford to become a “lackey” of the United States to deal with China. As noted below, this does not portend a breakdown of relations with the United States under a future hard-line BJP government; rather, it means that relations would require greater attention and management on both sides to avoid inflaming nationalist political sensitivities.

Gandhi, by contrast, views China as India’s primary regional threat and global competitor for recognition and influence. China presents to the world a successful model of prosperity under authoritarian governance. Gandhi believes that it is incumbent on India to counter this authoritarian state on its borders with a successful “democratic vision of [economic] production.” According to him, this presents a unique opportunity for the United States and India to cooperate and create a viable alternative to the Chinese model generally and to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative specifically. Thus, he advocates for “a vision of prosperity” that includes the West and India jointly competing with China. Yet, even he is clear that “the fight for democracy in India is India’s fight.” While democracy is a valuable basis for cooperation, it cannot come at the cost of India’s sovereignty.

Indeed, the next generation of Indian leaders across parties is aligned on the importance of preserving India’s sovereignty and on the need for a more multipolar world in which the country can play a leading role. These priorities imply that no matter which leader is in power in the future, the government will emphasize independence of action and be reluctant to bend national priorities to Washington’s interests. Even as opposition leader, Gandhi has supported the Modi government on issues where India’s core interests appear to be at odds with those of the United States, such as aggressively confronting Pakistan-sponsored terrorism and maintaining good relations with Russia.

India’s Enduring Foreign Policy Interests

Beyond U.S.-China strategic competition, the next generation of political leaders in India is already thinking critically about how to pursue a foreign policy agenda in an increasingly constrained geopolitical environment. India’s foreign policy interests can be grouped into three categories: building capabilities, countering regional rivals, and achieving great-power status. These broadly map onto the three factors animating the worldviews of the next generation of political leaders as discussed above: socioeconomic development, the regional security environment, and Indian exceptionalism.

Building capabilities is a primarily domestic enterprise. To this end, the Modi government has tried to boost Indian manufacturing through the Make in India initiative. Adityanath has consistently endorsed this initiative, most recently in the context of the U.S.-India trade agreement of February 2026. Gandhi, while endorsing the intent behind the initiative, has criticized it for focusing excessively on big business and the defense sector at the expense of small and medium-sized enterprises and other sectors. Both leaders would likely continue the initiative, albeit with differences in emphasis, in order to reduce India’s external economic dependence. In this context, the United States and China are both vital to India’s future as export and import markets, respectively. While the United States’s merchandise trade deficit with India in 2024 was $45.8 billion, India’s merchandise trade deficit with China was $99.2 billion.

Import dependence on China creates vulnerabilities for India not just because of potential supply-chain disruptions due to unforeseen events such as global pandemics, but also because of the potential for short- or long-term economic coercion by Beijing. Indian policymakers have therefore focused on strategies for managing ongoing and interconnected rivalries with Pakistan and China. Over the last two decades, the United States has played a major role as a source of hard-power capabilities and diplomatic support, not least due to Washington’s own sources of leverage over Pakistan. More recently, however, the Trump administration’s imposition of disproportionately high tariffs on India and development of ties with Pakistan damaged Indian elites’ perceptions of the United States. The ruling party’s own members of parliament spoke out against Donald Trump and the United States, and Modi engaged more actively with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

Adityanath and Gandhi took contrasting positions on U.S. tariffs. Adityanath avoided criticizing Trump, instead emphasizing the importance of finding new markets when faced with tariffs. Gandhi openly criticized the tariffs as “economic blackmail” and “an attempt to bully India into an unfair trade deal.” When the deal was struck, Gandhi excoriated Modi for being “compromised,” betraying the nation, and surrendering to Trump. Despite these differences, which can mostly be attributed to their respective positions inside and outside the ruling party, Adityanath and Gandhi agree on the importance of building a resilient and self-reliant economic base that can withstand future turbulence in the global economic system. Adityanath has emphasized the importance of Modi’s Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) initiative, while Gandhi has argued that U.S. tariffs have exposed India’s weakness on this front. A future government under either leader would thus seek to reduce India’s economic dependence on both the United States and China (a difficult process under the best conditions).

India’s unwillingness to fall in line with the United States is linked to a deep and abiding foreign policy interest in attaining great-power status. For decades, Indian leaders have sought a place for their nation at the high table of the international order. To this end, they have consistently supported a multipolar order in which power is more evenly distributed than during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath and in which no single state or coalition dominates the core institutions of global governance. For India, multipolarity in Asia is essential to constraining China, while multipolarity at the global level serves to prevent the United States from achieving the kind of systemic dominance it briefly exercised after World War II and the Cold War. Intensifying strategic competition between Washington and Beijing advances both objectives by limiting the ability of either power to establish durable preponderance. In this context, India pursues strategic autonomy—tilting between Washington and Beijing when necessary—as the optimal path to future global recognition and influence.

Although India’s next generation of political leaders is likely to operate within the same broad parameters outlined above, differences at the margin could prove consequential. The chief difference between the Hindu nationalism of Adityanath and the civic nationalism of Gandhi is the greater willingness of the latter to engage with Western democracies to counter China. This is not to say that a future Hindu nationalist leader will spurn the United States, but that cooperation could require more effort due to the ingrained sensitivity of this type of nationalism toward external influence and interference. Having said that, deep cooperation of any kind is only possible when the United States is not seen by the Indian elite and the Indian public as obstructing their country’s strategic autonomy and path to great-power status, regardless of the type of leadership that follows Modi.

Conclusion

Where is India’s approach to U.S.-China competition headed in the next five to ten years? From an Indian perspective, China has remained a largely predictable actor whose behavior toward India varies by degree but not does qualitatively change over time. The general parameters of the relationship are well established and known to both sides as competitive in most areas and cooperative in others. By contrast, the United States has lately presented a fundamentally different face to India, surprising not just Indian elites but also U.S. analysts. While this development may be surprising, an excessive focus on it risks obscuring the steady and quiet cooperation that now takes place between the two countries across various levels and functions of government, ranging from high-level strategic dialogues to sectoral working groups in defense, technology, critical minerals, energy, space, cybersecurity, and other areas. These developments suggest that U.S.-India relations are unlikely to return to the frigid state they were in for most of the Cold War.

Neither U.S. nor Indian leaders have been under any illusions about the basis of their cooperative relationship, which is primarily designed to create economic opportunities for firms in both countries and to enable both states to manage China’s rise. Officials in Washington have come to accept that India’s pursuit of great-power status through strategic autonomy places limits on its partnerships with other powers. For its part, the Indian establishment understands that Washington often expects a great deal from its allies and strategic partners, which will likely run counter to some of India’s own strategic priorities and long-term goals. The current deterioration in bilateral relations has not fundamentally changed either side’s understanding of the relationship. If anything, it has reinforced for India the value of multi-alignment and strategic autonomy, which have long been cornerstones of its foreign policy.

The worldviews of India’s next generation of political leadership reinforce this conclusion. Hindu nationalists typified by Yogi Adityanath and civic nationalists typified by Rahul Gandhi are united in their view of India as an exceptional and exemplary power on the global stage. They also see China as a prominent threat to India’s sovereignty and global ambition. They may differ somewhat in their willingness to engage with the United States, but neither group is unaware of the downsides of tying India’s fortunes too closely to one power or another. While in the near term Indian leaders may now see the United States as an unreliable and unpredictable actor, this change signals a course correction more than a breakdown of relations. Cooperation could be somewhat costlier in the future—in that Indian leaders will have to go to greater lengths to justify trusting the United States—but it will not be absent.

In practical terms, a more cautious Indian approach to U.S.-China competition is likely to manifest in three related ways. The first is greater diplomatic engagement with China to defuse current bilateral tensions while maintaining the foundations of the relationship already built with the United States. Second, New Delhi is likely to engage in greater outreach to global South countries to hedge against Beijing’s predictable and Washington’s unpredictable provocations. Third, India can be expected to make a greater push for self-reliance in manufacturing, technological innovation, and human capital development so as to reduce its reliance on external cooperation to build grand-strategic capabilities. These trends are not new, but they are likely to intensify in the years to come. At the same time, we can expect to see India, both now and in the future, continuing to make its claim to status and recognition as a great power by seeking reform of the international order and a greater role in global governance.

(The writer Rohan Mukherjee is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is also a Nonresident Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research and a Nonresident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.)