Why has the Philippines softened to China?

Such speculation is not without basis, but it must be recognized that while the Philippines is resuming engagement with China, it has not abandoned its fundamental strategy of using external forces to strengthen its balancing against China. On March 26, the Philippines signed a visiting forces agreement with France, continuing to emphasize the so-called "rules-based international order" and regional security cooperation. Earlier this month (April), Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force participates in the US-Philippines "Balikatan" military exercise, marking the first time since the end of World War II that Japanese troops set foot on Philippine territory.

In other words, what the Philippines is signaling is not a simple shift "from pro-America back to balance," but a more complex policy choice: relying on external forces for security, beginning to dial down tensions with China diplomatically, and seeking practical alternatives economically, energy in particular.

Based on publicly available information, the "softening" in the Philippines' attitude toward China is mainly reflected in three aspects: first, the reopening of bilateral communication channels; second, a shift from maritime provocation to a more complex, cooperative agenda on China-related issues; and third, the gradual formation of a new official narrative combining "no retreat on stance, continued dialogue, and negotiable cooperation." The question is not whether the Philippines remains tough on China, but rather that this toughness is now being accompanied by more mechanisms for management and repair.

The frequency of engagement has been restored. On January 29, China and the Philippines held preliminary talks in Cebu, Philippines. From February 27 to 28, further dialogue took place in Beijing. The Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs said the Philippines needs to reopen bilateral channels to manage the maritime situation and find common ground while protecting Philippine interests. On March 28, the 11th BCM meeting was held, meaning the Philippines completed a continuous cycle of communication with China, and communication itself is a signal of easing.

The agenda of topics has expanded. The March 28 talks also covered preliminary oil and gas cooperation, stable access to energy and fertilizer, renewable energy, agriculture, trade, as well as visa waivers and direct flights. The Philippines' initiative to bring energy, agriculture, trade, and other issues back to the negotiating table indicates that its policy thinking is adjusting toward "reviving functional issues beyond disputes." Against the backdrop of the Philippine government declaring a national energy emergency, this move highlights the practical considerations behind the Philippines' softening toward China.

The official narrative has grown more complex. On February 20, a spokesperson with the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs said the Philippines would continue to strengthen partnerships with "like-minded countries" to uphold the maritime order based on international law, while also maintaining open communication with China, seeking "candid, constructive dialogue and practical cooperation." At the same time, he emphasized that as the ASEAN chair for 2026, the Philippines is pushing for accelerated negotiations on the South China Sea Code of Conduct with China and other ASEAN countries, including increasing the frequency of meetings.

Thus, the Philippines is working to convey a message to the outside world: it has neither abandoned its so-called principled position nor closed the door to dialogue with China. This round of softening toward China is neither an emotional thaw nor a strategic shift, but rather a policy arrangement aimed at risk control, pressure relief, and repair.

The real change is that the Marcos administration has realized that relying solely on open provocation and security ties with external force is not enough to support the Philippines' long-term interests. It needs to add a more realistic patch to its existing course.

The reasons for the Philippines' recent softening toward China cannot be mechanically summarized as "the US is unreliable" or "the Philippines has changed its attitude." The real reasons lie in the shifting domestic political structure of the Philippines and the internal pressures facing the Marcos administration. Against this backdrop, the Marcos administration's provisional cooling of its China policy is not a revision of principles, but an effort to prevent external confrontation from continuing to consume its already strained governing resources.

The first pressure comes from the legitimacy issues facing Marcos himself. In February, the Philippine House of Representatives Justice Committee began deliberating an impeachment against Marcos, with one of the allegations being that he allowed former President Rodrigo Duterte to be transferred for trial in connection with the International Criminal Court case. Although studies suggest that Marcos still enjoys major support in Congress and the likelihood of impeachment is low, the political battle itself shows that the rift surrounding the Duterte issue is escalating into a serious political conflict. For Marcos, the focus of his administration has had to shift more toward stabilizing the domestic front.

The second pressure comes from intense competition with political rivals.

Currently, Philippine politics has entered a phase of high-intensity clan rivalry. On March 4, the Philippine House of Representatives Justice Committee found that the impeachment complaint against Vice President Sara Duterte had "substantial basis," with allegations including unexplained wealth, misappropriation of public funds, bribery, and threats against the president and his family. Sara Duterte is widely regarded as a strong contender for the 2028 presidential election, and this process could become a "preliminary battle" for future power struggles. Therefore, an important logic behind the recent softening toward China is that Marcos needs to avoid his China policy becoming a vulnerability that political opponents can exploit.

The third pressure comes from the role constraints of the ASEAN chair. On February 20, a Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs maritime affairs spokesperson stated that as the 2026 ASEAN chair, the Philippines would work with ASEAN member states and China to advance consultations on the South China Sea Code of Conduct. This statement suggests that the Philippines hopes to avoid falling into unmanageable confrontation with China during its ASEAN chairmanship. A country tasked with chairing the ASEAN agenda, promoting regional dialogue, and coordinating the positions of member states cannot afford to maintain its relationship with China in long-term conflict and confrontation.

The fourth pressure comes from the imminent danger to energy supplies. On March 24, Marcos declared a national energy emergency in the Philippines, citing the "imminent danger" posed by the Middle East conflict to the country's energy supply. As a country heavily dependent on imported energy and external shipping lanes, the Philippines has limited capacity to withstand the shocks of international conflicts. Once the energy issue enters a state of emergency, it will quickly affect transportation cost, agricultural production, food inflation, and social sentiment, eventually becoming a political problem.

For a government facing overlapping pressures from energy shocks, social tensions, and political struggles, the marginal returns of continuing confrontation with China are diminishing. Conversely, bringing oil and gas, energy, agriculture, fertilizer, trade, and shipping routes back into its agenda with China could provide the Marcos administration with more policy space.

In summary, the recent softening of the Philippines' attitude toward China is not a strategic reversal, but a tactical pullback as risk thresholds approach. In other words, the Philippines' current stance toward China is not so much softening as it is undergoing a limited, functional patch-up. Its goal is not to resolve the South China Sea dispute, nor to rebuild deep mutual trust, but to avoid composite risks to its economy, diplomacy, and domestic politics.

(The author Zhao Wenhao works at the Institute of International Relations, Yunnan University.)